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Abstract
We develop differentially private hypothesis testing methods for the small sample regime. Given a
sample D from a categorical distribution p over some domain Σ, an explicitly described distribution q
over Σ, some privacy parameter ε, accuracy parameter α, and requirements βI and βII for the type I and
type II errors of our test, the goal is to distinguish between p = q and dTV(p, q) ≥ α.
We provide theoretical bounds for the sample size |D| so that our method both satisfies (ε, 0)-
differential privacy, and guarantees βI and βII type I and type II errors. We show that differential
privacy may come for free in some regimes of parameters, and we always beat the sample complexity
resulting from running the χ2-test with noisy counts, or standard approaches such as repetition for
endowing non-private χ2-style statistics with differential privacy guarantees. We experimentally com-
pare the sample complexity of our method to that of recently proposed methods for private hypothesis
testing [GLRV16, KR17].
1 Introduction
Hypothesis testing is the age-old problem of deciding whether observations from an unknown phenomenon
p conform to a model q. Often p can be viewed as a distribution over some alphabet Σ, and the goal is
to determine, using samples from p, whether it is equal to some model distribution q or not. This type of
test is the lifeblood of the scientific method and has received tremendous study in statistics since its very
beginnings. Naturally, the focus has been on minimizing the number of observations from the unknown
distribution p that are needed to determine, with confidence, whether p = q or p 6= q.
In several fields of research and application, however, samples may contain sensitive information about
individuals; consider for example, individuals participating in some clinical study of a disease that carries
social stigma. It may thus be crucial to guarantee that operating on the samples needed to test a statistical
hypothesis protects sensitive information about the samples. This is not at odds with the goal of hypothesis
testing itself, since the latter is about verifying a property of the population p from which the samples are
drawn, and not of the samples themselves.
Without care, however, sensitive information about the sample might actually be divulged by statistical
processing that is improperly designed. As recently exhibited, for example, it may be possible to determine
whether individuals participated in a study from data that would typically be published in genome-wide
association studies [HSR+08]. Motivated in part by this realization, there has been increased recent interest
in developing data sharing techniques which are private [JS13, USF13, YFSU14, SSB16].
Protecting privacy when computing on data has been extensively studied in several fields ranging from
statistics to diverse branches of computer science including algorithms, cryptography, database theory, and
machine learning; see, e.g., [Dal77, AW89, AA01, DN03, Dwo08, DR14] and their references. A notion of
privacy proposed by theoretical computer scientists which has found a lot of traction is that of differential
privacy [DMNS06]. Roughly speaking, it requires that the output of an algorithm on two neighboring
datasets D and D′ that differ in the value of one element be statistically close. For a formal definition see
Section 2.
Our goal in this paper is to develop tools for privately performing statistical hypothesis testing. In
particular, we are interested in studying the tradeoffs between statistical accuracy, power, significance, and
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privacy in the sample size. To be precise, given samples from a categorical distribution p over some domain
Σ, an explicitly described distribution q over Σ, some privacy parameter ε, accuracy parameter α, and
requirements βI and βII for the type I and type II errors of our test, the goal is to distinguish between
p = q and dTV(p, q) ≥ α. We want that the output of our test be (ε, 0)-differentially private, and that the
probability we make a type I or type II error be βI and βII respectively. Treating these as hard constraints,
we want to minimize the number of samples that we draw from p.
Notice that the correctness constraint on our test pertains to whether we draw the right conclusion about
how p compares to q, while the privacy constraint pertains to whether we respect the privacy of the samples
that we draw from p. The pertinent question is how much the privacy constraint increases the number of
samples that are needed to guarantee correctness. Our main result is that privacy may come for free in
certain regimes of parameters, and has a mild cost for all regimes of parameters.
To be precise, without privacy constraints, it is well known that identity testing can be performed
from O(
√
n
α2 · log 1β ) samples, where n is the size of Σ and β = min{βI, βII}, and that this is tight [BFF+01,
Pan08, VV14, ADK15]. Our main theoretical result is that, with privacy constraints, the number of samples
that are needed is
O˜
(
max
{√
n
α2
,
√
n
α3/2ε
,
n1/3
α5/3ε2/3
}
· log(1/β)
)
. (1)
Our statistical test is provided in Section 5 where the above upper bound on the number of samples that
it requires is proven as Theorem 3. Notice that privacy comes for free when the privacy requirement ε is
Ω(
√
α) – for example when ε = 10% and the required statistical accuracy is 3%.
The precise constants sitting in the O(·) notation of Eq. (1) are given in the proof of Theorem 3. We
experimentally verify the sample efficiency of our tests by comparing them to recently proposed private
statistical tests [GLRV16, KR17], discussed in more detail shortly. Fixing a differential privacy and type I,
type II error constraints, we compare how many samples are required by our and their methods to distinguish
between hypotheses that are α = 0.1 apart in total variation distance. We find that different algorithms are
more efficient depending on the regime and properties desired by the analyst. Our experiments and further
discussion of the tradeoffs are presented in Section 6.
Approach. A standard approach to turn an algorithm differentially private is to use repetition. As already
mentioned above, absent differential privacy constraints, statistical tests have been provided that use an
optimal m = O(
√
n
α2 · log 1β ) number of samples. A trivial way to get (ε, 0)-differential privacy using such a
non-private test is to create O(1/ε) datasets, each comprising m samples from p, and run the non-private
test on one of these datasets, chosen randomly. It is clear that changing the value of a single element in
the combined dataset may only affect the output of the test with probability at most ε. Thus the output is
(ε, 0)-differentially private; see Section 3 for a proof. The issue with this approach is that the total number
of samples that it draws is m/ε = O(
√
n
εα2 · log 1β ), which is higher than our target. See Corollary 1.
A different approach towards private hypothesis testing is to look deeper into the non-private tests and try
to “privatize” them. The most sample-efficient tests are variations of the classical χ2-test. They compute
the number of times, Ni, that element i ∈ Σ appears in the sample and aggregate those counts using a
statistic that equals, or is close to, the χ2-divergence between the empirical distribution defined by these
counts and the hypothesis distribution q. They accept q if the statistic is low and reject q if it is high, using
some threshold.
A reasonable approach to privatize such a test is to add noise, e.g. Laplace(1/ε) noise, to each count
Ni, before running the test. It is well known that adding Laplace(1/ε) noise to a set of counts makes them
differentially private, see Theorem 1. However, it also increases the variance of the statistic. This has been
noticed empirically in recent work of [GLRV16] for the χ2-test. We show that the variance of the optimal χ2-
style test statistic significantly increases if we add Laplace noise to the counts, in Section 4.1, thus increasing
the sample complexity from O(
√
n) to Ω(n3/4). So this route, too, seems problematic.
A last approach towards designing differentially private tests is to exploit the distance beween the null
and the alternative hypotheses. A correct test should accept the null with probability close to 1, and reject
an alternative that is α-far from the null with probability close to 1, but there are no requirements for
correctness when the alternative is very close to the null. We could thus try to interpolate smoothly between
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datasets that we expect to see when sampling the null and datasets that we expect to see when sampling an
alternative that is far from the null. Rather than outputting “accept” or “reject” by merely thresholding our
statistic, we would like to tune the probability that we output “reject” based on the value of our statistic, and
make it so that the “reject” probability is ε-Lipschitz as a function of the dataset. Moreover, the probability
should be close to 0 on datasets that we expect to see under the null and close to 1 on datasets that we
expect to see under an alternative that is α-far. As we show in Section 4.2, χ2-style statistics have high
sensitivity, requiring ω(
√
n) samples to be made appropriately Lipschitz.
While both the approach of adding noise to the counts, and that of turning the output of the test Lipschitz
fail in isolation, our test actually goes through by intricately combining these two approaches. It has two
steps:
1. A filtering step, whose goal is to “reject” when p is blatantly far from q. This step is performed by
comparing the counts Ni with their expectations under q, after having added Laplace(1/ε) noise to
these counts. If the noisy counts deviate from their expectation, taking into account the extra variance
introduced by the noise, then we can safely “reject.” Moreover, because noise was added, this step is
differentially private.
2. If the filtering step fails to reject, we perform a statistical step. This step just computes the χ2-style
statistic from [ADK15], without adding noise to the counts. The crucial observation is that if the
filtering step does not reject, then the statistic is actually ε-Lipschitz with respect to the counts, and
thus the value of the statistic is still differentially private. We use the value of the statistic to determine
the bias of a coin that outputs “reject.”
Details of our test are given in Section 5.
Related Work. Identity testing is one of the most classical problems in statistics, where it is traditionally
called hypothesis or goodness-of-fit testing, see [Pea00, Fis35, RS81, Agr12] for some classical and contempo-
rary references. In this field, the focus is often on asymptotic analysis, where the number of samples goes to
infinity, and we wish to get a grasp on their asymptotic distributions and error exponents [Agr12, TAW10].
In the past twenty years, this problem has enjoyed significant interest in the theoretical computer science
community (see, i.e., [BFF+01, Pan08, LRR13, VV14, ADK15, CDGR16, DK16, DDK16], and [Can15] for a
survey), where the focus has instead been on the finite sample regime, rather than asymptotics. Specifically,
the goal is to minimize the number of samples required, while still remaining computationally tractable.
A number of recent works [WLK15, GLRV16, KR17] (and a simultaneous work, focused on independence
testing [KSF17]) investigate differential privacy with the former set of goals. In particular, their algorithms
focus on fixing a desired significance (type I error) and privacy requirement, and study the asymptotic
distribution of the test statistics. On the other hand, we are the first work to apply differential privacy to
the latter line of inquiry, where our goal is to minimize the number of samples required to ensure the desired
significance, power and privacy. As a point of comparison between these two worlds, we provide an empirical
evaluation of our method versus their methods.
The problem of distribution estimation (rather than testing) has also recently been studied under the
lens of differential privacy [DHS15]. This is another classical statistics problem which has recently piqued
the interest of the theoretical computer science community. We note that the techniques required for this
setting are quite different from ours, as we must deal with issues that arise from very sparsely sampled data.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper, we will focus on discrete probability distributions over [n]. For a distribution p, we will use
the notation pi to denote the mass p places on symbol i.
Definition 1. The total variation distance between p and q is defined as
dTV(p, q) =
1
2
∑
i∈[n]
|pi − qi| .
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Definition 2. A randomized algorithm M with domain Nn is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for all S ⊆
Range(M) and for all pairs of inputs D,D′ such that ‖D −D′‖1 ≤ 1:
Pr [M(D) ∈ S] ≤ eε Pr [M(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
If δ = 0, the guarantee is called pure differential privacy.
In the context of distribution testing, the neighboring dataset definition corresponds to two datasets
where one dataset is generated from the other by removing one sample. Up to a factor of 2, this is equivalent
to the alternative definition where one dataset is generated from the other by arbitrarily changing one sample.
Definition 3. An algorithm for the (α, βI, βII)-identity testing problem with respect to a (known) distribution
q takes m samples from an (unknown) distribution p and has the following guarantees:
• If p = q, then with probability at least 1− βI it outputs “p = q;”
• If dTV(p, q) ≥ α, then with probability at least 1− βII it outputs “p 6= q.”
In particular, βI and βII are the type I and type II errors of the test. Parameter α is the radius of dis-
tinguishing accuracy. Notice that, when p satisfies neither of cases above, the algorithm’s output may be
arbitrary.
We note that if an algorithm is to satisfy both these definitions, the latter condition (the correctness
property) need only be satisfied when p falls into one of the two cases, while the former condition (the
privacy property) must be satisfied for all realizations of the samples from p (and in particular, for p which
do not fall into the two cases above).
We recall the classical Laplace mechanism, which states that applying independent Laplace noise to a
set of counts is differentially private.
Theorem 1 (Theorem 3.6 of [DR14]). Given a set of counts N1, . . . , Nn, the noised counts (N1+Y1, . . . , Nn+
Yn) are (ε, 0)-differentially private when the Yi’s are i.i.d. random variables drawn from Laplace(1/ε).
Finally, we recall the definition of zero-concentrated differential privacy from [BS16] and its relationship
to differential privacy.
Definition 4. A randomized algorithm M with domain Nn is ρ-zero-concentrated differentially private
(ρ-zCDP) if for all pairs of inputs D,D′ such that ‖D −D′‖1 ≤ 1 and all α ∈ (1,∞):
Dα(M(D)||M(D′)) ≤ ρα,
where Dα is the α-Re´nyi divergence between the distribution of M(D) and M(D
′).
Proposition 1 (Propositions 1.3 and 1.4 of [BS16]). If a mechanism M1 satisfies (ε, 0)-differential privacy,
then M1 satisfies
ε2
2 -zCDP. If a mechanism M2 satisfies ρ-zCDP, then M2 satisfies (ρ + 2
√
ρ log(1/δ), δ)-
differential privacy for any δ > 0.
3 A Simple Upper Bound
In this section, we provide an O
(√
n
α2ε
)
upper bound for the differentially private identity testing problem.
More generally, we show that if an algorithm requires a dataset of size m for a decision problem, then it
can be made (ε, 0)-differentially private at a multiplicative cost of 1/ε in the sample size. This is a folklore
result, but we include and prove it here for completeness.
Theorem 2. Suppose there exists an algorithm for a decision problem P which succeeds with probability at
least 1 − β and requires a dataset of size m. Then there exists an (ε, 0)-differentially private algorithm for
P which succeeds with probability at least 45 (1− β) + 1/10 and requires a dataset of size O(m/ε).
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Proof. First, with probability 1/5, we flip a coin and output yes or no with equal probability. This guarantees
that we have probability at least 1/10 of either outcome, which will allow us to satisfy the multiplicative
guarantee of differential privacy.
We then draw 10/ε datasets of size m, and solve the decision problem (non-privately) for each of them.
Finally, we select a random one of these computations and output its outcome.
The correctness follows, since we randomly choose the right answer with probability 1/10, or with prob-
ability 4/5, we solve the problem correctly with probability 1−β. As for privacy, we note that, if we remove
a single element of the dataset, we may only change the outcome of one of these computations. Since we
pick a random computation, this is selected with probability ε/10, and thus the probability of any outcome
is additively shifted by at most ε/10. Since we know the minimum probability of any output is 1/10, this
gives the desired multiplicative guarantee required for (ε, 0)-differential privacy.
We obtain the following corollary by noting that the tester of [ADK15] (among others) requires O(
√
n/α2)
samples for identity testing.
Corollary 1. There exists an (ε, 0)-differentially private testing algorithm for the (α, βI, βII)-identity testing
problem for any distribution q which requires
m = O
(√
n
εα2
· log(1/β)
)
samples, where β = min (βI, βII).
4 Roadblocks to Differentially Private Testing
In this section, we describe roadblocks which prevent two natural approaches to differentially private testing
from working.
In Section 4.1, we show that if one simply adds Laplace noise to the empirical counts of a dataset (i.e.,
runs the Laplace mechanism of Theorem 1) and then attempts to run an optimal identity tester, the variance
of the statistic increases dramatically, and thus results in a much larger sample complexity, even for the case
of uniformity testing. The intuition behind this phenomenon is as follows. When performing uniformity
testing in the small sample regime (when the number of samples m is the square root of the domain size
n), we will see a (1 − o(1))n elements 0 times, O(√n) elements 1 time, and O(1) elements 2 times. If we
add Laplace(10) noise to guarantee (0.1, 0)-differential privacy, this obliterates the signal provided by these
collision statistics, and thus many more samples are required before the signal prevails.
In Section 4.2, we demonstrate that χ2 statistics have high sensitivity, and thus are not naturally differ-
entially private. In other words, if we consider a χ2 statistic Z on two datasets D and D′ which differ in one
record, |Z(D) − Z(D′)| may be quite large. This implies that methods such as rescaling this statistic and
interpreting it as a probability, or applying noise to the statistic, will not be differentially private until we
have taken a large number of samples.
4.1 A Laplaced χ2-statistic has large variance
Proposition 2. Applying the Laplace mechanism to a dataset before applying the identity tester of [ADK15]
results in a significant increase in the variance, even when considering the case of uniformity. More precisely,
if we consider the statistic
Z ′(D) =
∑
i∈[n]
(Ni + Yi −m/n)2 − (Ni + Yi)
m/n
where Ni is the number of occurrences of symbol i in the dataset D (which is of size Poisson(m)) and
Yi ∼ Laplace(1/ε), then
• If p is uniform, then E[Z ′] = 2n2ε2m and Var[Z ′] ≥ 20n
3
ε4m2 .
• If p is a particular distribution which is α-far in total variation distance from uniform, then E[Z ′] =
4mα2 + 2n
2
ε2m .
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The variance of the statistic can be compared to that of the unnoised statistic, which is upper bounded by
m2α4. We can see that the noised statistic has larger variance until m = Ω(n3/4).
Proof. First, we compute the mean of Z ′. Note that since |D| ∼ Poisson(m), the Ni’s will be independently
distributed as Poisson(mpi) (see, i.e., [ADK15] for additional discussion).
E[Z ′] = E
[ ∑
i∈[n]
(Ni + Yi −m/n)2 − (Ni + Yi)
m/n
]
= E
[ ∑
i∈[n]
(Ni −m/n)2 −Ni
m/n
+
∑
i∈[n]
Y 2i + 2Yi(Ni −m/n)− Yi
m/n
]
= m · χ2(p, q) +
∑
i∈[n]
2
ε2
m/n
= m · χ2(p, q) + 2n
2
ε2m
In other words, the mean is a rescaling of the χ2 distance between p and q, shifted by some constant amount.
When p = q, the χ2-distance between p and q is 0, and the expectation is just the second term. Focus on
the case where n is even, and consider p such that pi = (1 + 2α)/n if i is even, and (1 − 2α)/n otherwise.
This is α-far from uniform in total variation distance. Furthermore, by direct calculation, χ2(p, q) = 4α2,
and thus the expectation of Z ′ in this case is 4mα2 + 2n
2
ε2m .
Next, we examine the variance of Z ′. Let λi = mpi and λ′i = mqi = m/n. By a similar computation as
before, we have that
Var[Z ′] =
∑
i∈[n]
1
λ′2i
[
2λ2i + 4λi(λi − λ′i)2
+
1
ε2
(8λi + 2(2λi − 2λ′i − 1)2) +
20
ε4
]
.
Since all four summands of this expression are non-negative, we have that
Var[Z ′] ≥ 20
ε4
∑
i∈[n]
1
λ′2i
=
20n3
ε4m2
.
If we wish to use Chebyshev’s inequality to separate these two cases, we require that Var[Z ′] is at most
the square of the mean separation. In other words, we require that
20n3
ε4m2
≤ m2α4,
or that
m = Ω
(
n3/4
εα
)
.
4.2 A χ2-statistic has high sensitivity
Consider the primary statistic which we use in Algorithm 1:
Z(D) =
1
mα2
∑
i∈[n]
(Ni −mqi)2 −Ni
mqi
.
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As shown in Section 5, E[Z] = 0 if p = q and E[Z] ≥ 1 if dTV(p, q) ≥ α, and the variance of Z is such that
these two cases can be separated with constant probability. A natural approach is to truncate this statistic
to the range [0, 1], interpret it as a probability and output the result of Bernoulli(Z) – if p = q, the result is
likely to be 0, and if dTV(p, q) ≥ α, the result is likely to be 1. One might hope that this statistic is naturally
private. More specifically, we would like that the statistic Z has low sensitivity, and does not change much
if we remove a single individual. Unfortunately, this is not the case. We consider datasets D,D′, where D′
is identical to D, but with one fewer occurrence of symbol i. It can be shown that the difference in Z is
|Z(D)− Z(D′)| = 2|Ni −mqi − 1|
m2α2qi
Letting q be the uniform distribution and requiring that this is at most ε (for the sake of privacy), we have
a constraint which is roughly of the form
2Nin
m2α2
≤ ε,
or that
m = Ω
(√
Ni
√
n
ε0.5α
)
.
In particular, if Ni = n
c for any c > 0, this does not achieve the desired O(
√
n) sample complexity. One
may observe that, if Ni is this large, looking at symbol i alone is sufficient to conclude p is not uniform, even
if the count Ni had Laplace noise added. Indeed, our main algorithm of Section 5 works in part due to our
formalization and quantification of this intuition.
5 Priv’IT: A Differentially Private Identity Tester
In this section, we prove our main testing upper bound:
Theorem 3. There exists an (ε, 0)-differentially private testing algorithm for the (α, βI, βII)-identity testing
problem for any distribution q which requires
m = O˜
(
max
{√
n
α2
,
√
n
α3/2ε
,
n1/3
α5/3ε2/3
}
· log(1/β)
)
samples, where β = min (βI, βII).
The pseudocode for this algorithm is provided in Algorithm 1. We fix the constants c1 = 1/4 and
c2 = 3/40. For a high-level overview of our algorithm’s approach, we refer the reader to the Approach
paragraph in Section 1.
Proof of Theorem 3: We will prove the theorem for the case where β = 1/3, the general case follows at
the cost of a multiplicative log(1/β) in the sample complexity from a standard amplification argument. To
be more precise, we can consider splitting our dataset into O(log(1/β)) sub-datasets and run the β = 1/3
test on each one independently. We return the majority result – since each test is correct with probability
≥ 2/3, correctness of the overall test follows by Chernoff bound. It remains to argue privacy – note that a
neighboring dataset will only result in a single sub-dataset being changed. Since we take the majority result,
conditioning on the result of the other sub-tests, the result on this sub-dataset will either be irrelvant to or
equal to the overall output. In the former case, any test is private, and in the latter case, we know that the
individual test is ε-differentially private. Overall privacy follows by applying the law of total probability.
We require the following two claims, which give bounds on the random variables Ni and Yi. Note that,
due to the fact that we draw Poisson(m) samples, each Ni ∼ Poisson(mpi) independently.
Claim 1. |Yi| ≤ 2c2ε log
(
1
1−(1−c2)1/|A|
)
simultaneously for all i ∈ A with probability exactly 1− c2.
Proof. The survival function of the folded Laplace distribution with parameter 2/c2ε is exp (−c2εx/2), and
the probability that a sample from it exceeding the value 2c2ε log
(
1
1−(1−c2)1/|A|
)
is equal to 1− (1− c2)1/|A|.
The probability that probability that it does not exceed this value is (1 − c2)1/|A|, and since the Yi’s are
independent, the probability that none exceeds this value is 1− c2, as desired.
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Algorithm 1 Priv’IT: A differentially private identity tester
1: Input: ε; an explicit distribution q; sample access to a distribution p
2: Define A ← {i : qi ≥ c1α/n}, A¯ ← [n] \ A
3: Sample Yi ∼ Laplace(2/c2ε) for all i ∈ A
4: if there exists i ∈ A such that |Yi| ≥ 2c2ε log
(
1
1−(1−c2)1/|A|
)
then
5: return either “p 6= q” or “p = q” with equal probability
6: end if
7: Draw a multiset S of Poisson(m) samples from p
8: Let Ni be the number of occurrences of the ith domain element in S
9: for i ∈ A do
10: if |Ni + Yi −mqi| ≥ 2c2ε log
(
1
1−(1−c2)1/|A|
)
+ max
{
4
√
mqi log n, log n
}
then
11: return “p 6= q”
12: end if
13: end for
14: Z ← 2mα2
∑
i∈A
(Ni−mqi)2−Ni
mqi
15: Let T be the closest value to Z which is contained in the interval [0, 1]
16: Sample b ∼ Bernoulli(T )
17: if b = 1 then
18: return “p 6= q”
19: else
20: return “p = q”
21: end if
Claim 2. |Ni − mpi| ≤ max
{
4
√
mpi log n, log n
}
simultaneously for all i ∈ A with probability at least
1− 2n0.84 − 1.1n .
Proof. We consider this in two cases. Let X be a Poisson(λ) random variable. First, assume that λ ≥
e−3 log n. By Bennett’s inequality, we have the following tail bound [Pol15, Can17]:
Pr [|X − λ| ≥ x] ≤ 2 exp
(
−x
2
2λ
ψ
(x
λ
))
,
where
ψ(t) =
(1 + t) log(1 + t)− t
t2/2
.
Consider x = 4
√
λ log n. At this point, we have
ψ(x/λ) = ψ(4
√
log n/λ) ≥ ψ(4e3/2) ≥ 0.23.
Thus,
Pr
[
|X − λ| ≥ 4
√
λ log n
]
≤ 2 exp (−0.23 · 8 log n)
≤ 2n−1.84.
Now, we focus on the other case, where λ ≤ e−3 log n. Here, we appeal to Proposition 1 of [Kla00], which
implies the following via Stirling’s approximation:
Pr [|X − λ| ≥ kλ] ≤ k
k − 1 exp(−λ+ kλ− kλ log k).
We set kλ = log n, giving the upper bound
k
k − 1n
1−log k ≤ 1.1 · n−2.
We conclude by taking a union bound over [n], with the argument for each i ∈ [n] depending on whether
λ = mpi is large or small.
We proceed with proving the two desiderata of this algorithm, correctness and privacy.
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Correctness. We use the following two properties of the statistic Z(D), which rely on the condition that
m = Ω(
√
n/α2). The proofs of these properties are identical to the proofs of Lemma 2 and 3 in [ADK15],
and are omitted.
Claim 3. If p = q, then E[Z] = 0. If dTV(p, q) ≥ α, then E[Z] ≥ 1.
Claim 4. If p = q, then Var[Z] ≤ 1/1000. If dTV(p, q) ≥ α, then Var[Z] ≤ 1/1000 ·E[Z]2.
First, we note that, by Claim 1, the probability that we return in line 5 is exactly c2. We now consider
the case where p = q. We note that by Claim 2, the probability that we output “p 6= q” in line 10 is o(1),
and thus negligible. By Chebyshev’s inequality, we get that Z ≤ 1/10 with probability at least 9/10, and we
output “p = q” with probability at least c2/2 + (1− c2) · (9/10− c2)2 ≥ 2/3 (note that we subtract c2 from
9/10 since we are conditioning on an event with probability 1 − c2, and by union bound). Similarly, when
dTV(p, q) ≥ α, Chebyshev’s inequality gives that Z ≥ 9/10 with probability at least 9/10, and therefore we
output “p 6= q” with probability at least 2/3.
Privacy. We will prove (0, c2ε/2)-differential privacy. By Claim 1, the probability that we return in line 5
is exactly c2. Thus the minimum probability of any output of the algorithm is at least c2/2, and therefore
(0, c2ε/2)-differential privacy implies (ε, 0)-differential privacy.
We first consider the possibility of rejecting in line 11. Consider two neighboring datasets D and D′,
which differ by 1 in the frequency of symbol i. Coupling the randomness of the Yj ’s on these two datasets,
the only case in which the output differs is when Yi is such that the value of |Ni + Yi−mqi| lies on opposite
sides of the threshold for the two datasets. Since Ni differs by 1 in the two datasets, and the probability
mass assigned by the PDF of Yi to any interval of length 1 is at most c2ε/4, the probability that the outputs
differ is at most c2ε/4. Therefore, this step is (0, c2ε/4)-differentially private.
We next consider the value of Z for two neighboring datasets D and D′, where D′ has one fewer occurrence
of symbol i. We only consider the case where we have not already returned in line 11, as otherwise the value
of Z is irrelevant for determining the output of the algorithm.
Z(D)− Z(D′)
=
1
mα2
[
(Ni −mqi)2 −Ni
mqi
− (Ni − 1−mqi)
2 − (Ni − 1)
mqi
]
=
1
mα2
[
(Ni −mqi)2 −Ni
mqi
− (Ni −mqi)
2 − 2(Ni −mqi) + 1−Ni + 1
mqi
]
=
2(Ni −mqi − 1)
m2α2qi
.
Since we did not return in line 11,
|Ni −mqi| ≤ 4
c2ε
log
(
1
1− (1− c2)1/n
)
+ max
{
4
√
mqi log n, log n
}
≤ 4 log(n/c2)
c2ε
+ max
{
4
√
mqi log n, log n
}
This implies that
|Z(D)− Z(D′)| = 2|Ni −mqi − 1|
m2α2qi
≤ 2
m2α2qi
(
6 log(n/c2)
c2ε
+ 4
√
mqi log n
)
.
We will enforce that each of these terms are at most c2ε/8.
12 log(n/c2)
m2α2qic2ε
≤ c2ε
8
⇒ m ≥
√
96
c22c1
√
n log(n/c2)
α1.5ε
8
√
log n
m1.5α2
√
qi
≤ c2ε
8
⇒ m ≥
(
64
c2
√
c1
)2/3
(n log n)1/3
α5/3ε2/3
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Since both terms are at most c2ε/8, this step is (0, c2ε/4)-differentially private. Combining with the
previous step gives the desired (0, c2ε/2)-differential privacy, and thus (as argued at the beginning of the
privacy section of this proof) ε-pure differential privacy.
6 Experiments
We performed an empirical evaluation of our algorithm, Priv’IT, on synthetic datasets. All experiments
were performed on a laptop computer with a 2.6 GHz Intel Core i7-6700HQ CPU and 8 GB of RAM.
Significant discussion is required to provide a full comparison with prior work in this area, since performance
of the algorithms varies depending on the regime.
We compared our algorithm with two recent algorithms for differentially private hypothesis testing:
1. The Monte Carlo Goodness of fit test with Laplace noise from [GLRV16], MCGOF;
2. The projected Goodness of Fit test from [KR17], zCDP-GOF.
We note that we implemented a modified version of Priv’IT, which differs from Algorithm 1 in lines 14
to 21. In particular, we instead consider a statistic
Z =
∑
i∈A
(Ni −mqi)2 −Ni
mqi
.
We add Laplace noise to Z, with scale parameter Θ(∆/ε), where ∆ is the sensitivity of Z, which guarantees
(ε/2, 0)-differential privacy. Then, similar to the other algorithms, we choose a threshold for this noised
statistic such that we have the desired type I error. This algorithm can be analyzed to provide identical
theoretical guarantees as Algorithm 1, but with the practical advantage that there are fewer parameters to
tune.
To begin our experimental evaluation, we started with uniformity testing. Our experimental setup was
as follows. The algorithms were provided q as the uniform distribution over [n]. The algorithms were also
provided with samples from some distribution p. This (unknown) p was q for the case p = q, or a distribution
which we call the “Paninski construction” for the case dTV(p, q) ≥ α. The Paninski construction is a
distribution where half the elements of the support have mass (1 + α)/n and half have mass (1− α)/n. We
use this name for the construction as [Pan08] showed that this example is one of the hardest to distinguish
from uniform: one requires Ω(
√
n/α2) samples to (non-privately) distinguish a random permutation of this
construction from the uniform distribution. We fixed parameters ε = 0.1 and α = 0.1. In addition, recall
that Proposition 1 implies that pure differential privacy (the privacy guaranteed by Priv’IT) is stronger
than zCDP (the privacy guaranteed by zCDP-GOF). In particular, our guarantee of ε-pure differential privacy
implies ε2/2-zCDP. As a result, we ran zCDP-GOF with a privacy parameter of 0.005-zCDP, which is equivalent
to the amount of zCDP our algorithm provides. Our experiments were conducted on a number of different
support sizes n, ranging from 10 to 10600. For each n, we ran the testing algorithms with increasing sample
sizes m in order to discover the minimum sample size when the type I and type II errors were both empirically
below 1/3. To determine these empirical error rates, we ran all algorithms 1000 times for each n and m, and
recorded the fraction of the time each algorithm was correct. As the other algorithms take a parameter βI
as a target type I error, we input 1/3 as this parameter.
The results of our first test are provided in Figure 1. The x-axis indicates the support size, and the y-axis
indicates the minimum number of samples required. We plot three lines, which demonstrate the empirical
number of samples required to obtain 1/3 type I and type II error for the different algorithms. We can see
that in this case, zCDP-GOF is the most statistically efficient, followed by MCGOF and Priv’IT.
To explain this difference in statistical efficiency, we note that the theoretical guarantees of Priv’IT
imply that it performs well even when data is sparsely sampled. More precisely, one of the benefits of our
tester is that it can reduce the variance induced by elements whose expected number of occurrences is less
than 1. Since none of these testers reach this regime (i.e., even zCDP-GOF at n = 10000 expects to see each
element 10 times), we do not reap the benefits of Priv’IT. Ideally, we would run these algorithms on the
uniform distribution at sufficiently large support sizes. However, since this is prohibitively expensive to do
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Figure 1: The sample complexities of Priv’IT, MCGOF, and zCDP-GOF for uniformity testing
with thousands of repetitions (for any of these methods), we instead demonstrate the advantages of our
tester on a different distribution.
Our second test is conducted with q being a 2-histogram1, where all but a vanishing fraction of the
probability mass is concentrated on a small, constant fraction of the support2. This serves as our proxy
for a very large support, since now we will have elements which have a sub-constant expected number of
occurrences. The algorithms are provided with samples from a distribution p, which is either q or a similar
Paninski construction as before, where the total variation distance from q is placed on the support elements
containing non-negligible mass. We ran the test on support sizes n ranging from 10 to 6800. All other
parameters are the same as in the previous test.
The results of our second test are provided in Figure 2. In this case, we compare Priv’IT and zCDP-GOF,
and note that our test is slightly better for all support sizes n, though the difference can be pronounced
or diminished depending on the construction of the distribution q. We found that MCGOF was incredibly
inefficient on this construction – even for n = 400 it required 130000 samples, which is a factor of 10 worse
than zCDP-GOF on a support of size n = 6800. To explain this phenomenon, we can inspect the contribution
of a single domain element i to their statistic:
(Ni + Yi −mqi)2
mqi
.
In the case where mqi  1 and p = q, this is approximately equal to Y
2
i
mqi
. The standard deviation of this
term will be of the order 1mqiε2 , which can be made arbitrarily large as mqi → 0. While zCDP-GOF may
naively seem susceptible to this same pitfall, their projection method appears to elegantly avoid it.
As a final test, we note that zCDP-GOF guarantees zCDP, while Priv’IT guarantees (vanilla) differen-
tial privacy. In our previous tests, our guarantee was ε-differential privacy, while theirs was ε
2
2 -zCDP: by
Proposition 1, our guarantees imply theirs. In the third test, we revisit uniformity testing, but when their
guarantees imply ours. More specifically, again with ε = 0.1, we ran zCDP-GOF with the guarantee of ε
2
2 -
zCDP and Priv’IT with the guarantee of ( ε
2
2 + ε
√
2 log(1/δ), δ) for various δ > 0. We note that δ is often
thought in theory to be “cryptographically small” (such as 2−100), but we compare with a wide range of δ,
both large and small: δ = 1/et for t ∈ {1, 2, 4, 8, 16}. This test was conducted on support sizes n ranging
from 10 to 6000.
The results of our third test are provided in Figure 3. We found that, for all δ tested, Priv’IT required
fewer samples than zCDP-GOF. This is unsurprising for δ very large and small, since the differential privacy
guarantees become very easy to satisfy, but we found it to be true for even “moderate” values of δ. This
1A k-histogram is a distribution where the domain can be partitioned into k intervals such that the distribution is uniform
over each interval.
2In particular, in Figure 3, n/200 support elements contained 1 − 10/n probability mass, but similar trends hold with
modifications of these parameters.
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Figure 2: The sample complexities of Priv’IT and zCDP-GOF for identity testing on a 2-histogram
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Figure 3: The sample complexities of Priv’IT and zCDP-GOF for uniformity testing, with approximate
differential privacy
implies that if an analyst is satisfied with approximate differential privacy, she might be better off using
Priv’IT, rather than an algorithm which guarantees zCDP.
While the main focus of our evaluation was statistical in nature, we will note that Priv’IT was more
efficient in runtime than our implementation of MCGOF, and more efficient in memory usage than our imple-
mentation of zCDP-GOF. The former point was observed by noting that, in the same amount of time, Priv’IT
was able to reach a trial corresponding to a support size of 20000, while MCGOF was only able to reach 10000.
The latter point was observed by noting that zCDP-GOF ran out of memory at a support size of 11800. This
is likely because zCDP-GOF requires matrix computations on a matrix of size O(n2). It is plausible that all of
these implementations could be made more time and memory efficient, but we found our implementations
to be sufficient for the sake of our comparison.
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